P. Sarangapani (Dead) Through LR Paka Saroja Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh - Once the undue advantage i.e., any gratification whatever, other than the legal remuneration is proved to have been accepted by the accused, the Court is entitled to raise the presumption under Section 20 that he accepted the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly.

 SCI (21.09.2023) In P. Sarangapani (Dead) Through LR Paka Saroja Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. .2173 of 2011, Neutral Citation 2023INSC844] held that;;

• In the instant case the appellant/ accused in his explanation under Section 313 had accepted the receipt of alleged amount. The court therefore was required to appreciate the evidence laid by the prosecution in the light of the said explanation and to consider as to whether the said amount was an illegal gratification other than the legal remuneration or not.

• However, the court cannot be oblivious to the statutory presumption permissible to be raised under Section 20 of PC Act with regard to the motive of the accused.

• Once the undue advantage i.e., any gratification whatever, other than the legal remuneration is proved to have been accepted by the accused, the Court is entitled to raise the presumption under Section 20 that he accepted the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly.

• Therefore, the burden had shifted on the appellant to dispel the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the said Act, and prove that it was not accepted as a motive or reward for the performance of his public duty,

Excerpts of the Order;    

# 1. The original appellant P. Sarangapani son of  Laxmaiah (accused no.1) having expired pending the present Appeal, his wife Paka Saroja was permitted to proceed further with the Appeal as per the order passed by the court on 31st August, 2023.

# 2. The instant Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21st March, 2011 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.54 of 2005, whereby the High Court had dismissed the Appeal filed by the appellant-accused no.1 and confirmed the judgment and order dated 06.01.2005 passed by the Principal Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court) in CC No.08 of 1994. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant accused no.1 P.Sarangapani for the offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, the PC Act) and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 7 and to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for two years and pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the P.C. Act.

# 3. The chargesheet for the alleged offences was laid by the Investigating Officer, Deputy Superintendent of Police Shri P.L. Raju, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Warangal Range, Warangal against the appellant accused no.1 P.Sarangapani and one another accused .Vasudev son of Mallaiah. The said accused P.Vasudev having expired pending trial, the appellant accused alone was tried by the Trial Court. The defacto-complainant Sri Immadi Laxmaiah also had expired prior to commencement of the trial and therefore he could not be examined by the prosecution.

# 4. The case of prosecution in nutshell was that the appellant accused Sri Sarangapani while discharging his duty as the Sub Registrar, Cooperative Societies  had demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.1500/- as gratification other then legal remuneration from the defacto-complainant Sri Immadi Laxmaiah on 27.03.1993, for himself and for the accused no.2 P.Vasudev, the Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies in the office of Divisional Cooperative Khammam, as a motive or reward for showing an official favour, in allowing the complainant to continue as the President of the Society, and thereby both the accused had committed the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the PC Act.

# 5. To prove the charges levelled against the appellant accused, the prosecution had examined PW-1 Shri Dana Pullaiah to prove the contents of the RC No.1496/92- C. The PW-2 Sri M. Laxmi Narsu, one of the mediators (panch witness) working as Agricultural Officer, in the office of Joint Director Agriculture Khammam was examined to prove the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings. The PW-3 Sri K.L.N. Krishna Kumar was examined to prove the Sanction orders relating to the accused, accorded by the then Secretary of Agriculture Cooperative – II Department. The PW-4 was Sri B. Pulla Reddy, working as the President of Lachannagudem Village, who succeeded the Vice President of the society, on the previous Vice President B. Pulla Reddy having been suspended. The PW-5 was Sri V. Vengalaiah, Inspector of Police ACB, a member of raiding party; and lastly PW-6 Sri P.L.Raju, the then DSP Warangal Range, was examined as he was the trap laying officer cum investigating officer. The prosecution had also adduced documentary evidence in support of its case. 

# 6. On the closure of prosecution evidence, the appellant-accused P.Sarangapani was examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C, wherein he had denied the allegations levelled against him and had stated that he was falsely implicated. He also had filed a written statement contending inter alia that he never demanded and accepted any illegal gratification from the complainant as alleged. The appellant accused had also examined DW-1 Sri K. Venkateshwarlu, resident of Chintakani Mandal of Khammam District, to substantiate his defence.

# 7. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral as well as the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, held that the prosecution had proved the charges levelled against the appellant/ accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as stated hereinabove. In the Appeal preferred by the appellant before the High Court, against the said judgment of conviction and sentence, the High Court reappreciated the evidence on record and confirmed the conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

# 8. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that both the courts had committed gross error of law in mis-appreciating evidence on record and in holding the appellant guilty of the alleged charges, though the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the demand of illegal gratification allegedly made by the appellant. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in case of B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2014) 13 SCC 55], he submitted that it was required to be proved by the prosecutor beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe, and in  absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification, presumption under Section 20 could not be drawn against the accused. According to him in the instant case, the complainant having expired before the commencement of trial, could not be examined and hence the very allegation of demand of money as bribe was not proved by the prosecution. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the statement of complainant recorded before the Additional I-Class Magistrate under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. to submit that the complainant himself had stated therein that he had paid the amount to the accused towards the Audit fees of the society and that the accused was falsely implicated by the former President of the society Pulla Reddy, who had a grudge against the accused.

# 9. In our opinion, there is no substance in any of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is well settled proposition of law that the death of the complainant or nonavailability of the complainant at the time of trial could be said to be fatal to the case of prosecution, nor could it be said to be a ground to acquit the accused. It is always open for the prosecution to prove the contents of the complaint and other facts in issue by leading other oral or documentary evidence, in case of death of or nonavailability of the complainant. Recently, the Constitution Bench in case of Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [(2023) 4 SCC 731], has held that: -

• “88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.”

# 10. In the instant case the appellant/ accused in his explanation under Section 313 had accepted the receipt of alleged amount. The court therefore was required to appreciate the evidence laid by the prosecution in the light of the said explanation and to consider as to whether the said amount was an illegal gratification other than the legal remuneration or not. It cannot be gainsaid that if the accused offers reasonable and probable explanation based on the evidence that the money was accepted by him other than as illegal gratification, the benefit of doubt should be granted to the accused. It is also true that the accused is not required to establish his defence beyond reasonable doubt as the prosecution, and can establish the same on the preponderance of probability. However, the court cannot be oblivious to the statutory presumption permissible to be raised under Section 20 of PC Act with regard to the motive of the accused. Section 20 reads as under: -

• “20. Presumption where public servant accepts any undue advantage. — 

• Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or under section 11, it is proved that a public servant accused of an offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain that undue advantage, as a motive or reward under section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly either by himself or by another public servant or, as the case may be, any undue advantage without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate under section 11.”

# 11. In view of the above, once the undue advantage i.e., any gratification whatever, other than the legal remuneration is proved to have been accepted by the accused, the Court is entitled to raise the presumption under Section 20 that he accepted the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly. No doubt, such  presumption is rebuttable. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta (supra), also had dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the Act and held as under: -

• “88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.”

# 12. In the instant case the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings were duly proved by the prosecution by examining the concerned witnesses, who had duly supported the case of prosecution. Both the courts below have recorded the findings that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the conscious acceptance of the tainted currency by the accused and also the recovery of tainted currency from the appellant. Therefore, the burden had shifted on the appellant to dispel the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the said Act, and prove that it was not accepted as a motive or reward for the performance of his public duty, which the appellant had failed to dispel. The explanation offered by the appellant did not tally with the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The High Court had also recorded that the defence taken by the appellant that the acceptance of tainted currency by him was towards the Audit fees of the Society was not proved by him in as much as there was nothing on record to show that the amount paid by the complainant Immadi Laxmaiah to the appellant was out of the funds of the Society.

# 13. Both the courts have appreciated the evidence on record threadbare in the right perspective and have found the appellant guilty for the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act. We do not see any valid ground to interfere with the well considered findings recorded by both the courts below.

# 14. In that view of the matter, the criminal appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.

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Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation - Considering the fact that the appointment of Resolution Professional is made during the resolution process before the Company Law Tribunal with its approval, he will be a public servant under Section 2(c)(v) of the P.C. Act.

  HC Jharkhand (05.04.2023) In Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Anti Corruption Bureau, Dhanbad [Cr. M.P. No. 1048 of 2021] held that;

• Considering the fact that the appointment of Resolution Professional is made during the resolution process before the Company Law Tribunal with its approval, he will be a public servant under Section 2(c)(v) of the P.C. Act.

• Functions and obligations of Insolvency Professionals are as set out under Section 208 of I & B Code which are public in nature. These functions intimately relate to matters relating to loans extended by the Banks which is investments from public at large and therefore will come within the meaning of public duty as provided under Section 2-c(viii) of the P.C. Act.

• Section 232 does not exclude operation of P.C. Act. Therefore, the plea the petitioner was not a public servant and was immune from criminal prosecution under PC Act is not tenable.

Excerpts of the order; 

# 1. Instant petition has been filed for quashing of entire criminal proceeding instituted against the petitioner including the F.I.R. being R.C.1(A)/2020-D, CBI, ACB, Dhanbad for the offence under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter called ‘PC Act’).

# 2. The petitioner is an ‘Insolvency Professional’ as defined under Section 3(19) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter called ‘the I&B Code’) enrolled under Section 207 of the I&B Code. 

# 3. Corporate debtors are M/s Adi Ispat Private limited and M/s Bir Ispat Pvt. Ltd., Giridih.

# 4. Financial Creditors are State Bank of India for Rs 1,35,39,27,277 and Operation Creditor is Damodar Valley Corporation for Rs 6,28,31,085/-

# 5. NCLT vide its order dated 22.11.2019 and 06.01.2020 appointed this petitioner, as interim Resolution Professional (IRP) for both companies in terms of Section 7(3)(b) r/w Section 16 of I&B Code.

# 6. The petitioner was appointed as Resolution Professional by the Committee of Creditors.

# 7. The complainant is Amit Sarawgi, Director of M/s Adi Ispat (P) Limited and it is alleged that petitioner had demanded a bribe of Rs.2,00,000/- per month for showing leniency in the insolvency resolution process for extending CIRP process from 09 months to 02 years and also demanded Rs.20,00,000/- for obtaining favourable forensic audit/valuation report from his chosen Forensic Auditor/Valuer and for helping in re-possession of plant/company. The petitioner had offered him that SME, the complainant was entitled to participate in the auction proceeding of the Bank and if he met the demands, he would prepare his report leniently enabling him re-possess his plant/company.

# 8. The complaint was discreetly verified. Trap team was constituted and raid was conducted at Giridih at the Company office, where the petitioner was caught read handed on 11.2.2020 in the presence of independent witnesses accepting the illegal gratification from the complainant.

# 9. Instant petition for quashing of the F.I.R. is premised mainly on the ground that Section 7 of PC Act will not apply to this petitioner as a ‘Resolution Professional’ is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act or under Section 21 of the IPC.

# 10. It is argued that he is neither public servant nor he is appointed by any Court or is performing any public duty. The appointment process of resolution professional is provided under Section 22 of the Code, 2016 under which he is appointed by the committee of the creditors. The duty which has been detailed in Section 25 are not in the nature of public duty as contemplated under Section 2(c)(viii).

# 11. Further, I&B Code is a self-contained Code and specific provisions have been provided for redressal of grievance of any party. Under Chapter VI of the Code, Section 217, the complaints against insolvency professional agency or its member or information utility. It is proposed to be made to the Board. There are further provisions regarding the amendment in Finance, Account and Audit which is put down under Chapter VII. Reliance is placed on the following authorities Innoventive Industries Limited Versus ICICI Bank & Another; (2018) 1 SCC 407 wherein it has been held that “It is settled law that a consolidating and amending Act like the present Central enactment forms a code complete in itself and in exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein”. 

Arcelormittal India (P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1 it has been held,

• 80. However, it must not be forgotten that a Resolution Professional is only to “examine” and “confirm” that each resolution plan conforms to what is provided by Section 30(2). Under Section 25(2)(i), the Resolution Professional shall undertake to present all resolution plans at the meetings of the Committee of Creditors. This is followed by Section 30(3), which states that the Resolution Professional shall present to the Committee of Creditors, for its approval, such resolution plans which confirm the conditions referred to in sub-section (2). This provision has to be read in conjunction with Section 25(2)(i), and with the second proviso to Section 30(4), which provides that where a resolution applicant is found to be ineligible under Section 29-A(c), the resolution applicant shall be allowed by the Committee of Creditors such period, not exceeding 30 days, to make payment of overdue amounts in accordance with the proviso to Section 29-A(c). A conspectus of all these provisions would show that the Resolution Professional is required to examine that the resolution plan submitted by various applicants is complete in all respects, before submitting it to the Committee of Creditors. The Resolution Professional is not required to take any decision, but merely to ensure that the resolution plans submitted are complete in all respects before they are placed before the Committee of Creditors, who may or may not approve it.

# 12. It is further argued that Section 232 of the I&B Code provides that the Chairperson, Members, officers and other employees of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Code, to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). The list does not include Insolvency Professionals. Section 233 gives protection to resolution professional, insolvency professional from any criminal prosecution or other legal action for the act done in good faith.

# 13. It is submitted by Mr. P.A.S. Pati, learned counsel on behalf of C.B.I. that the instant matter involves a case where the petitioner was caught red handed by the trap team constituted by the CBI, while accepting Rs. Two Lakh as illegal gratification in connection with discharge of his duty as Resolution Professional from the complainant.

# 14. On the question whether a Resolution Professional is a public servant or not, it is argued that the process of appointment of a Resolution Professional commences from Section 16 of the I&B Code, 2016 wherein it has been submitted that the adjudicating authority shall appoint an interim resolution professional. His appointment is further made under Section 22 by the committee of creditors after its constitution and the information regarding the appointment is to be communicated to the adjudicating authority. Even in case of replacement of Resolution Professional by the committee of creditors under Section 27 (3) and (4), the committee of creditors shall forward the name of the insolvency professional proposed by them to the adjudicating authority which will forward it to the Board for its confirmation. Against this scheme of Code, it is argued that it is not correct to say that the adjudicating authority has no role in the appointment of Resolution Professional. 

# 15. Having been appointed in the resolution process before Company  Law Tribunal the duty that is discharged by him is in connection with administration of justice and therefore his office will come within the meaning of ‘Public Servant’ under Section 2-c(v) of the P.C. Act which is as under

• “Any person authorized by a Court of justice to perform any duty, in connection with the transmission of justice, including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner appointed by such Court”.

# 16. Reliance is placed on Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 wherein meaning of ‘Public Servant’ has been exposited by the Supreme Court under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act.

• 42. Section 2(c) defines “public servant”. The definition is extremely wide and includes within its ken even arbitrators or other persons to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by a court of justice or by a competent public authority [See Section 2(c)(vi)]. Also included are office-bearers of registered cooperative societies engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, who receive financial aid from the Government [See Section 2(c)(ix)]. Office-bearers or employees of educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institutions in whatever manner established, receiving financial assistance from the Government or local or other public authorities are also included [see Section 2(c)(xii)]. The two Explanations to Section 2(c) are also revealing — whereas Explanation 1 states that in order to be a public servant, one need not be appointed by the Government, Explanation 2 refers to a de facto, as opposed to a de jure, public servant, discounting whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that “situation”.

In State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360 the nature of duty exercised was regarded as the determinative factor to decide whether the person sought to be proceeded was a public servant or not. If he was held to be exercising public duty, he can be held to be a public servant. The emphasis was not on the mode of appointment or remuneration, but if he was exercising a public duty or not. On this test it was held that the trustee in the Board of “deemed university” came withing the meaning of a “public servant” covered under Section 2(c) of the PC Act. The Court held as under,

• 34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention was not to provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered, rather a general definition of “public servant” is provided thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to the definition of the term “university”………

• 44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant State, it cannot be stated that a “deemed university” and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a university simpliciter, and the officials therein.

# 17. The central question in the instant petition is whether ‘Resolution Professional’ as defined under Section 22 of the I&B Code will come within the meaning of ‘Public Servant’ under Section 2 (c) of the PC Act?

# 18. This court is of the view that resolution professional will come within the meaning of a public servant under Section 2(c) the PC Act for the reason that definition of public servant as given under the PC Act is very wide and expansive. It is not limited to those serving under the Government or its instrumentalities and drawing salary from the public exchequer. Apart from the list of the functionaries given in Section 2 (c), the definition also lays down the functional criteria to include within its fold those discharging public duty or any duty authorized by a court of justice, in connection with administration of justice. In State v. C.N. Manjunath, (2017) 11 SCC 361 the question involved was whether the licensed surveyors in Taluks came within the meaning of ‘public servant’ under the PC Act. It was held :

• 8. Once the nature of performance of duties gets crystallised, no doubt remains that these licensed surveyors would come within the ambit of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and particularly clauses (i) and (viii) thereof, which defines “public servant” to mean:

• “2. (c)(i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;

• (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty;”

• 9. We would also like to refer to the definition of “public duty” as contained in Section 2(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which reads as under:

• “2. (b) “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that they were public servant as they were discharging public duty.

# 19. The petitioner was appointed as an interim resolution professional under Section 16 of the I & B Code, 2016 and later his appointment was confirmed by the committee of creditors under Section 22.

# 20. Under Section 16 (1) an interim resolution professional is appointed by the adjudicating authority on the insolvency commencement date. Under section 22 (3)(a), the committee of creditors after taking a decision to continue the interim resolution professional as the resolution professional, is required to communicate its decision to Adjudicating Authority and others. Even in cases where resolution professional appointed under section 22 is replaced by the committee of creditors under section 27, the name of the insolvency professional proposed to be appointed is to be forwarded to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 22(3), and thereafter the Adjudicating Authority is to forward the name of the proposed resolution professional to the Board for its confirmation in the same manner as laid down in Section 16. Against this scheme of the I&B Code the plea advanced on behalf of the petitioner that Adjudicating Authority had no role in the appointment of Resolution Professional is not sustainable.

# 21. Considering the fact that the appointment of Resolution Professional is made during the resolution process before the Company Law Tribunal with its approval, he will be a public servant under Section 2(c)(v) of the P.C. Act.

# 22. The next question for consideration is whether the functions of a Resolution Professional partake the character of a ‘public duty’?

# 23. Functions and obligations of Insolvency Professionals are as set out under Section 208 of I & B Code which are public in nature. These functions intimately relate to matters relating to loans extended by the Banks which is investments from public at large and therefore will come within the meaning of public duty as provided under Section 2-c(viii) of the P.C. Act.

# 24. It is true that Resolution Professional do not figure among the officers enumerated under Section 232 of I & B Code deemed to be a public servant within the meaning under section 21 of the IPC. Those who are deemed to be a public servant enjoy certain immunities from criminal prosecution for IPC offences under section 197 of Cr.P.C, as the cognizance cannot be taken without the previous sanction of the Central or State Government as the case may be. But this does not refer to, any immunity from criminal prosecution for offences committed under the PC Act.

# 25. Section 233 gives protection to a resolution professional from criminal prosecution for acts in good faith, and not where he has been apprehended red-handed with the bribe amount. Insolvency and bankruptcy code is self-contained code but only with respect to the matter provided therein. It does not cover the matters like the present, where a Resolution Professional takes bribes in order to favour a party for which P.C. Act is squarely applicable. Section 232 does not exclude operation of P.C. Act. Therefore, the plea the petitioner was not a public servant and was immune from criminal prosecution under PC Act is not tenable.

# 26. From the aforesaid discussion it is manifest that the appointment of resolution professional is made by the National Company Law Tribunal, which is the Adjudicating Authority for the insolvency resolution process of the companies under the I & B Code, 2016. Resolution Professional has a key role to play in the insolvency resolution process and to protect the assets of the corporate debtors. From his nature of assignment and duty to be performed his office entails performance of functions which are in the nature of public duty and therefore will come within the meaning of public servant both under sections 2 (c) (v) & (viii) of the PC Act. The plea that the Petitioner was not a Public Servant within the meaning of the PC Act is rejected. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition does not fulfill the parameters for

quashing and, accordingly, stands rejected.

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